The combination of leniency programmes, high sanctions, complaints from customers and private actions for damages, has proven very successful at uncovering and punishing cartel agreements in the US. Countless jurisdictions are being encouraged to adopt these 'conventional' enforcement tools, in the absence of an international competition authority. The purpose of this paper is to widen the debate on cartel enforcement by identifying three issues which can undermine their effectiveness in some jurisdictions: (1) Corruption and organised crime; (2) Social norms that are sympathetic to collusive practices; (3) Collectivist business cultures built on personal relationships. September 2008 JEL Classification Codes: D21, K21, K42, L40, Z1
Introduction
Cartels have come to be seen as 'cancers on the open market economy'; as the 'supreme evil' of antitrust, and as striking 'at the very heart of the principal virtue of economic activity'. 1 However, the prohibition and punishment of practices such as price fixing and market sharing is a relatively recent phenomenon in the majority of legal jurisdictions. With the support and guidance of the US Department of Justice, European Commission and international organisations, many are still reforming competition laws and adopting the tools of cartel enforcement which have proved so successful in the US. Characteristically, these include the offer of immunity to the first firm to self-report an infringement and the imposition of heavy sanctions on every other cartel member. 2 They also include a reliance on customers to report suspected infringements to the competition authority and sue for any damages incurred. 3 The purpose of this paper is to widen the debate on cartel enforcement, which has thus far focused on the design of the policy tools notably the US and EU. Many international cartels may thus be worth while, especially as they are estimated to typically raise prices by 30 per cent and have the most damaging effects on developing countries. 6 In the absence of an international enforcement agency, cooperation between competition authorities and harmonisation of competition laws (especially leniency programmes) is thought to be essential to achieving some level of deterrence. 7 It is also important that local cartels are uncovered and punished as these can be very damaging within individual jurisdictions, especially where there is bid rigging in public procurement. The most active competition authorities in the world have dealt with this challenge by providing encouragement and assistance to countries with no formal cartel enforcement regime in place, spurred on by international bodies such as the OECD, UN, Leniency programmes overcome these problems by inducing a firm to produce evidence of an infringement in return for immunity. Subsequent firms to come forward will also usually cooperate in return for a reduced fine.
Leniency also encourages cooperation where a cartel is uncovered through investigations alone. Fundamentally, leniency programmes assume that firms are driven purely by economic incentives (the pursuit of cartel profits) that will be undermined by the availability of immunity to one firm only. Deterrence is ostensibly achieved by ensuring that the sanctions and likelihood of detection 8 J Ayers and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, (OUP New York 1992) 9 Although high levels of damage suits can negate the effects of a leniency programme, as even immunity will generally provide no protection from such follow-on actions 10 In Europe, the Court of First Instance's decision in Woodpulp made it clear that circumstantial economic evidence alone could not prove an infringement, unless every other possible explanation for the observed behaviour is successfully rebutted outweigh the benefits. 11 It is thus necessary that high sanctions accompany leniency in order to ensure infringements are sufficiently punished and that the offer of immunity is tempting enough to induce self-reporting. However, the ability to impose fines of such a magnitude carries with it enormous responsibility.
Abuse of cartel laws by corrupt and weak institutions
Cartel enforcement is particularly susceptible to corruption because fines which are criminal in character are normally imposed through an administrative system in which the competition authority acts as both investigator and judge. These authorities are not always independent of direct political control, and normally retain wide discretion in calculating fines and granting leniency. The inadequate funding that many competition authorities receive often reflects the motivations behind adopting such policies. Cartel laws can be adopted as part of a broad package of market-oriented liberalisation and structural reforms. They can also be adopted to enhance commercial prestige, to successfully negotiate trade agreements, to attract foreign direct investment, as a pre-requisite of financial assistance from the IMF or World
Bank, and in order to increase the prospects of EU membership. 
Social norms as a barrier to enforcement
Legal enforcement mechanisms cannot function unless they are based on a broad consensus about the normative legitimacy of the rules -in other words, unless the rules are backed by social norms.
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Social norms are intrinsically difficult concepts to define, but essentially they 'instinctively inform people's first reaction to a given activity'. 34 One of the greatest challenges facing any jurisdiction adopting cartel laws is hardening popular attitudes to practices such as price fixing and market sharing.
Historically, the treatment of price fixing outside North America has been favourable. Sympathetic social norms make it less likely that customers will report suspected collusive practices to the competition authority. They also raise the danger that businesses will successfully lobby government to oppose any attempts by the regulator to step up enforcement (i.e. increasing fines and leniency). Social norms opposing cartels have the potential not only to overcome these problems, but also to complement sanctions and encourage desistance. Education is an obvious avenue for changing social norms, but educating people about the harmful effects of cartels is not easy.
Unlike conventional crimes such as theft, cartel practices are not universally treated as objectionable or harmful. This is mainly because of the past treatment of such behaviour by governments and the judiciary. It is well known that for most of the 19 th and 20 th centuries, European governments treated many cartels as furthering the public interest. In Germany, membership of cartels was sometimes compulsory -particularly in times of economic instability when collusive agreements were viewed as a useful way of stabilising spiralling prices. 35 As recently as ten years ago in the UK, cartels received nothing more than a regulatory slap on the wrist. In addition, English common law has shown a remarkable tolerance of restraints of trade. The long standing principle in Adelaide Steamship is that:
no contract was ever an offence at common law merely because it was in restraint of trade…The right of an individual to carry on his trade or business in the manner he considers best in his own interests involves the right of combining with others in a common course of action, provided such common course of action is undertaken with a single view to the interests of the combining parties and not with a view to injure others. This was in part due to the localised nature of many Australian industries, with employees believing that an attack on their employer was an attack on them.
With these firms and their employees operating within specific constituencies, politicians showed a willingness to respond positively. 48 Political pressure exerted in this way left the competition authority isolated between public scepticism and business hostility on the one hand, and political pressure to revert back to soft enforcement on the other. The ACCC fought off these pressures thanks to the strong leadership of Allan Fels who, upon retiring, expressed some surprise at having lasted so long.
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Social norms opposing price fixing can strengthen the deterrent effect of cartel enforcement by encouraging desistance, even where the potential costs of colluding do not clearly outweigh the expected benefits. 50 There is also empirical evidence to suggest a particularly strong correlation between desistance and an expectation that peers will obey a given law. 51 Research into tax evasion shows that how a crime is perceived can be as important in achieving deterrence as the probability of detection and size of the sanction.
Firstly, a popular stigma attached to the behaviour will add a social cost to legal sanctions. Information and education can play a key role in shaping them; for example, public information campaigns have completely changed social norms in relation to smoking, wearing seatbelts and drink-driving. However, apart from the historical tolerance of cartels outlined above, there are a number of other obstacles to changing attitudes on price fixing. For one thing, the causal link between cartels and the harm they cause can be somewhat remote. Many cartels are formed in upstream markets (such as raw materials) where their customers (other firms) will simply pass the cost down the production chain.
Final consumers will ultimately suffer a loss as a result of such a cartel, but that loss will be shared between a large number of actors; the individual loss may thus be negligible. Competition authorities frequently draw parallels between collusion and theft, but the prejudice or loss caused to another's property as a result of price fixing is not always clear or easily quantifiable.
Even conceptualising this loss entails some estimate of what the price would have been, had the cartel not formed. This is no easy task given that market conditions constantly change, impacting firms' costs, and that cartels will not necessarily be successful at raising prices. Even if they were, consumers may pay a cartel-inflated price that they objectively feel is fair for the product in question. There is no positive deception necessarily involved in cartel practices, which is why it was not deemed to constitute conspiracy to defraud in Norris.
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The design of cartel laws is also not conducive to hardening attitudes. As the agreement is illegal, cartelists cannot sue for breach of contract. They must contend with the threat of one cartelist cheating the agreement and undercutting the cartel for personal gain. They also have to contend with the danger of one firm breaking ranks and applying for leniency; an option that becomes more of a risk the greater the difference between the immunity prize and the fine otherwise faced. It is hoped that these conventional enforcement tools are undermining the purely economic incentives that underpin these collusive agreements, inducing self-reporting en masse. Evidence from the chemicals industry would certainly suggest that many cartels are undermined by distrust and that firms are very willing to approach the competition authority when their industry is under investigation, or where the cartel is failing to raise prices.
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One way in which adherence to informal agreements can be strengthened is by underpinning economic incentives with personal or collective ties. As the a role where players in an industry are located in a common geographical area, for example in the same small town or city where the raw resource is being extracted and refined'. 64 In a study of British shipping cartels in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, Podolney and Scott find that the social status of an entrant owner was found to dissuade the predation behaviour of incumbent cartels. This was especially so where owners were new and had not built up reputations for being dependable co-operators.
Many societies around the world are characterised by close families and intense social interaction. Harmony is often important in such environments;
'confrontation of another person is considered rude and undesirable'. 65 Group membership of this kind is said to be 'psychologically rewarding', and its resulting loyalty is thought to be strong enough to deter defection from the group even in a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game. 66 This business culture is inherently collusive and runs counter to the adversarial dynamic which fuels competition, and its resulting benefits. The notion that one should befriend individuals in business and bring them into one's home, can be an explicit social mechanism for ensuring that an agreement is honoured in the absence of strong legal protection. Posner notes,
Where there is a general distrust due to great uncertainty in the environment stemming from unreliable legal, political, commercial and other institutions, there will be greater reliance on personal relations to buffer one from wider insecurities.
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A closely-related aspect to this is the history of personal rights. Economic Generally there is a positive correlation between wealth and individualism, with some exceptions (Japan). Perhaps increased wealth encourages people to break away from the 'group' more, for their relative gains from it have diminished. Thus we might expect South Korea to be substantially less collectivist today than it was when this study was conducted. We can see from because it is considered socially disruptive, these mechanisms also make private enforcement very unlikely. Hofstede's study gives us some indication of which countries are likely to be more collectivist; however a more recent study is needed to better determine the effects of increased wealth over time.
Concluding remarks and policy implications
The combination of leniency programmes and high sanctions has proven very successful at uncovering and punishing cartel agreements in the US.
Complaints from customers who later seek damages from infringing firms have complemented these basic enforcement tools. Spurred on by the US Department of Justice, the European Commission and a number of international organisations, countless jurisdictions are being encouraged to adopt these 'conventional' enforcement tools in the absence of an international competition authority. This is considered an important step in achieving some level of effective deterrence against international cartels and punishing local infringements. This paper has identified a number of obstacles which may exist to the universal efficacy of 'conventional' enforcement tools.
These obstacles fall outside the economic considerations which typically inform the design of competition policy. Much of the evidence referred to in this paper is anecdotal, but its purpose is to widen the debate on cartel enforcement to include discussions of the environments in which cartel policy is being adopted and applied. Each of the three issues identified require further research and empirical study.
Firstly, the ability to impose high sanctions and grant immunity is susceptible to corruption, especially if regulators tend to be underfunded and are under direct political control. Underfunding is made more likely where jurisdictions are pressured into adopting competition laws, for example as a prerequisite to a development loan or in order to attract foreign investment. 87 Direct political control is likely to blunt any serious attempts to tackle cartel infringements as the political and commercial elite tend to overlap in many jurisdictions. Where there are high levels of organised crime, conventional leniency and sanctions are unlikely to break collusive agreements built upon a threat of violence.
Customers are also far less likely to approach the regulator with a complaint, and increasing sanctions against such cartels may simply lead to an escalation in the threats of violence. It may be counterproductive for pressure to be exerted on jurisdictions to adopt cartel laws, especially as part of a broader package of competition laws. Cartel enforcement is resourceintensive and may divert scarce funds away from more important reforms (for example to the judiciary) which will help tackle the problems of corruption and organised crime. 87 The OECD believes that greater funding will also increase the perceived legitimacy of competition laws. OECD (n 19) at 49
Secondly, social norms may typically be weak or sympathetic towards price fixing outside of North America because such practices have historically been treated favourably. Such popular perceptions do nothing to encourage desistance, and make it less likely that complaints of such practices will be received by the competition authority, or that private enforcement will occur.
They also raise the danger that businesses will successfully lobby government to oppose any attempts by the regulator to step up enforcement (higher fines, 
